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1See also Sinn (1995).
2Labour subsidies have also been advocated by Akerlof et al. (1991).
The governments of nearly all industrialised countries use subsidies to support the economic
development of specific sectors or regions with high rates of unemployment. Conventional
economic wisdom suggests that the most efficient policy would be to reduce the cost of labour,
that is to pay employment subsidies. Empirically, however, governments usually rely on
investment rather than employment subsidies. In the debate on these subsidy policies, economists
have repeatedly argued that the concentration of public support on investment schemes is
inefficient. One example is the case of Eastern Germany, where, in spite of very high rates of
unemployment, subsidy programmes almost exclusively support investment. Sinn and Sinn
(1993) argue that the public support schemes for Eastern Germany distort the relative price
between capital and labour and thus give rise to excessively capital intensive production.
1 They
conclude that this policy is suboptimal and that it contributes to the unemployment problem.
Begg and Portes (1993) make the same type of argument and conclude that it would be desirable
to switch to labour subsidies.
2
However, while it may well be that investment subsidies are inefficiently high in certain cases, the
fact that these subsidies are much more important empirically than employment subsidies seems
to be a very general phenomenon. It is therefore unsatisfactory to argue that it simply reflects
irrational economic policy decisions. It is the purpose of the present paper to provide an
economic explanation for the dominance of investment relative to employment subsidies. We
analyse the issue of investment versus employment subsidies in a simple model where
unemployment arises due to bargaining between unions and heterogenous firms, which differ
with respect to their productivity. Union bargaining power raises wage costs and leads to a
socially inefficient liquidation of firms with low productivity and a corresponding loss of jobs. As
in Grout (1984), however, union-firm bargaining also leads to underinvestment. In this
framework, it turns out that investment subsidies dominate employment subsidies in terms of
welfare. The reason is that investment subsidies are a more efficient instrument to alleviate the
underinvestment problem and to raise the number of operating firms. 2
In the following, we proceed as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence on the role of
employment and investment subsidies in industrialised countries. In section 3, possible
explanations for the dominance of investment incentives are discussed. In section 4, we develop
the model sketched above. In section five, we compare the effects of investment and employment
subsidies. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Investment and Employment Subsidies: Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present some empirical evidence about the role of investment and employment
subsidies in industrialized countries. Somewhat surprisingly, there are few empirical studies
trying to assess quantitatively the relative importance of these two types of subsidies. In the
following, we discuss the results of three different studies. Firstly, on the basis of data collected
by the OECD (1996), we consider the structure of aggregate general public support to industry
in the OECD countries. Secondly, we use a report on regional incentive programmes in Europe
(Yuill (1994)) to illustrate the role of capital and employment subsidies in individual European
countries. Thirdly, we briefly consider the case of East Germany. In all cases, regional or sectoral
subsidies are analysed. Subsidisation of employment and investment is measured relative to the
general tax and social security system in the various countries under consideration. Our approach
thus identifies how policies for specific sectors or regions are designed.
The most comprehensive study of public support policies is provided by the OECD (1996). This
study covers 1552 public support programmes, all aiming at the manufacturing sector, in 24
OECD member countries, the Slovak republic and at the EU level. The study classifies the
subsidy programmes, among other things, according to “policy objectives pursued” and
“economic activities supported”. In this classification, 40% of all subsidies can be assigned to the
groups of employment or investment promoting policies. The remaining 60% mainly comprise
research and development and export promotion subsidies, which cannot unambiguously be
considered as supporting specifically either employment or investment. The absolute and relative
shares of investment and employment subsidies of the remaining 40% of overall subsidies are
reported in table 1.3
3The absolute level of subsidies reprted in table 1 seems fairly low. This reflects that the
OECD calculates subsidies according to its “net cost to government” (NGC) concept. “NGC
calculates the difference between the cost of funding a programme in any given year and the
revenue generated for the public budget by the same programme in any given year.”
(OECD(1996), p. 12). Of course, such an approach raises various methodological problems that
cannot be discussed here.
Table 1: Subsidies to Industry in the OECD, Net Cost to Government, Million US-$
Subsidy
Type
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Investment 13468,1 16376,6 18945,1 19103,5 17754,7
(%) 86,6 87,1 87,2 88,5 88,9
Employ-
ment
2084,1 2422 2783,4 2482,3 2208,4
(%) 13,4 12,9 12,8 11,5 11,1
Total 15552,2 18798,6 21728,5 21585,8 19963,1
(%) 100 100 100 100 100
Source: OECD (1996), Own Calculations
It turns out that, between 1989 and 1993, around 87% of these subsidies were directed towards
the support of investment, whereas only about 13% were devoted to supporting employment. In
absolute terms, expenditure on investment-promoting measures in the OECD was thus roughly
six times as high as expenditure on programmes promoting employment.
3 Even in relation to all
subsidies (including the 60% which cannot be classified), programmes promoting investment thus
absorbed 36% of overall public support. The authors of the study therefore conclude: “...this (the
large share of investment subsidies, C.F./B.H.) shows the extent to which manufacturing
investment is an engine of economic development and job creation.” (OECD(1996), p. 9.).      
         
 
Another study which sheds some light on the relative empirical importance of employment and
investment subsidies is Yuill et al. (1994). This study is more limited by the fact that it only
covers regional policies in a sample of EU countries and only the three or four most important
programmes for each country. The study has the advantage, however, that the data is country4
specific.
Table 2: Regional Incentives in Europe 
Country
(1) Capital Subs. Labour Subs. No Classif.
Belgium           X
France X
 (2)
Germany           X           X
 (3)
Greece           X
Ireland           X           X
Italy           X           X
(4)
Luxemburg           X
Netherlands           X
Portugal           X           X
Spain           X
Sweden           X          X
United Kingdom           X          X
Source: Yuill et al. (1994)
(1) Among the EU member states, the table excludes Denmark, which 
has abolished its regional incentive programs in 1991. Austria and Finland
are not covered by the report.
(2) These are a) the Regional Policy Grant, which is a per job subsidy 
combined with a ceiling for grants as a percentage of investment and 
b) the Local Business Tax Concession; the base of the Local Business tax
includes both the firm`s assets and the payroll.  
(3) As part of a general investment grant program which is a capital subsidy, 
there is a “special investment grant available for the creation of “high-grade-jobs”.
(4) Yuill et al. (1994) report no labour subsidies for Italy. The Social Security Concessions,
however, have to be considered in our view as an incentive reducing the cost of labour.
Table 2 shows that, while in nearly all countries under consideration, investment promotion plays
an important role, significant programmes directly subsidising labour are reported for three
countries only. Table 3 shows the expenditure shares of investment and employment subsidies.
Here, it turns out that, even in those countries which do have employment subsidies, expenditure
on investment promotion is much more important, with the exception of Italy.
Table 3: Regional Subsidies (Millions, nat. Currencies)5
4Only the three quanitatively most important measure are covered. For a more detailed









Belgium 100 8362 - 8362
France n.a.
2) - - 1278 1278
Germany 55,5 2876 - 2308 5184
Greece 100 77161 - - 77161
Ireland 80,4 140 - 34 174
Italy 33,5 3251750 6455333 - 9707083
Luxemburg 100 1281 - - 1281
Netherlands 100 222 - - 222
Portugal n.a.
2) 10140 - n.a.
2) 10140
Spain 100 84547 - - 84547
Sweden 78,5 803 220 - 1023
United Kingdom 94,2 251 15 - 266
Source: Yuill (1994), Own Calculations
1) Average per Year 1988-1991
2) Not applicable or no data on expenditures available.
European Regional Policies thus also place emphasis on investment rather than employment
subsidies.
An important case of a substantial government subsidy programme, which has received
considerable attention among economists, is the transformation of Eastern Germany after
reunification. Table 4 gives an overview over the budgetary cost of the most important subsidy
programmes for Eastern Germany.
4 Here, it turns out that over 90% of the expenditure takes the
form of investment subsidies whereas programmes directly promoting employment are almost
negligible. The figures given above mainly include subsidies for on-the job training and support
for the employment of special groups, such as immigrants of German origin from Eastern6
5Finally, it is interesting to note that a similar picture emerges for Canada where, in the
Atlantic Provinces, investment is subsidized while no direct measures for supporting employment
are undertaken (see the Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1998)).
Europe. Explicit and general wage subsidy programmes aiming at reducing the cost of labour in
Eastern Germany do not exist. 
Table 4: Subsidies in Eastern Germany 1991-1994, Million DM
Subsidy
Type 
1991 1992 1993 1994
Investment
1) 9920 12080 15430 15500




451,6 990,6 1392,5 1541,3
(%) 4,4 7,6 8,3 9,0
Total 10371,6 13070,6 16822,5 17041,3
(%) 100 100 100 100
Source: Sachverständigenrat/German Council of Economic Advisers (1995/96), Own Calculations.
1) Includes: Investment Allowances according to the Laws on Corporate and Personal Income Taxation,
Investment Grants on the basis of the program “Common Task: Improvement of Regional Economic Structure”
(Gemeinschaftsaufgabe: Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur) and Special Depreciation Provisions
according to the “Regional Support Law” (Fördergebietsgesetz).
2) Includes: Promotion of “Starting to Work”, Subsidies for On-the Job Training, Diverse Labour Market
Integration Programmes.
Eastern Germany is thus a striking example for the dominance of investment subsidies relative to
measures directly promoting employment.
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In summary, the empirical evidence given in this paragraph suggests that the preference for
investment over employment subsidies is a reasonably general phenomenon. This raises the
question of how the dominance of investment subsidies can be explained. Possible answers to this
question will be discussed in the following paragraph.
3. The Investment Subsidy Puzzle7
6See, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
7One might also argue that investment subsidies are a result of rent seeking. Goolsbee
(1997) argues that a large part of the benefits of investment tax incentives in the U.S. have gone
to suppliers of capital goods through higher prices rather than investing firms. The producers of
capital goods are certainly in the position to form a pressure groups that may influence tax
policy.
One reason for the higher level of investment subsidies may simply be that employment and
investment subsidies have different underlying policy objectives. While employment subsidies
clearly have the function to raise employment, investment may be subsidised for  reasons not
directly related to labor markets. Most importantly, investment subsidies are also an instrument
to raise economic growth. The endogenous growth literature has identified various externalities
arising from private investment in physical capital. These externalities may justify investment
subsidies.
6 Investment grants may also be a result of tax competition, where national
governments offer fiscal incentives to attract internationally mobile capital.
7 
It is a shortcoming of these explanations, however, that they call for broadly-based investment
incentives. Most existing programmes, in contrast, are highly selctive and are typically designed
to favour investment in certain sectors or regions. Moreover, the preferred regions are often
those suffering from high rates of unemployment. One prominent example is, of course, Eastern
Germany; another one is the Atlantic Provinces in Canada. The officially declared objective of
subsidy programmes also typically includes job creation. This raises the question of why
governments prefer investment to employment subsidies, given that unemployment is almost
always a key problem of the supported regions. In fact, in a standard labour market model with
rigid wages, it is a straightforward exercise in welfare analysis to show that employment
subsidies strictly dominate investment subsidies (Begg and Portes (1993), Sinn (1995)). The
policy implications of this theoretical benchmark case stand in marked contrast to the policy
actually pursued by most governments. In the following, we will try to resolve this investment
subsidy puzzle. 
Before turning to our own model, we should briefly discuss two other possible explanations.
First, many practitioners argue that, while there may be a theoretical case for wage subsidies,
they are much more difficult to administer than investment subsidies. A second possible8
Y(Ki;Li)%zmyi (1)
explanation has been given by Torsvik (1993). In the model of his paper, employment subsidies
represent a first-best policy. The first-best, however, cannot be implemented because there is a
time inconsistency problem. In his model, the government cannot commit to future payments of
employment subsidies promised to firms in the present. Investment subsidies, in contrast, are paid
immediately and therefore serve as a substitute for employment subsidies. This argument,
however, has the weakness that it does not explain why the government should not pay out
labour subsidies immediately as well, based on future employment as announced by the firms, and
raise taxes later in case the firm does not fulfill its employment obligations. 
In what follows, we develop a model which gives a different explanation. In this model, union-
firm bargaining distorts both employment and investment decisions and leads to an inefficiently
low number of active firms. To correct these distortions, the government may use investment and
employment subsidies. Our key result is that investment subsidies strictly dominate employment
subsidies in this framework.
4. A Model to Explain the Investment Subsidy Puzzle
In this section, we develop a model which will be used to provide an explanation for the
investment subsidy puzzle. We proceed as follows. In 4.1., the basic structure of the model is
presented. In 4.2., we discuss the benchmark case of a competitive labour market. In 4.3., we
derive the equilibrium with union-firm bargaining.
  
4.1. The Basic Structure of the Model
There are two groups of agents in the economy: entrepreneurs and workers. Each entrepreneur
owns a firm which produces a homogenous numeraire good. The output of firm i is
where Ki and Li are capital and labour employed by firm i. Y is a strictly concave production9
Y(Ki;Li)%zmyi&wL$(1%r0)Ki (2)
function satisfying the standard neoclassical properties. Y(K;L) is common to all firms whereas
µi denotes a firm-specific random output shock; z is a positive parameter. For the economy as a
whole, µ is assumed to be uniformly distributed with support [0;1]. For analytical convenience,
we normalize the number of entrepreneurs and firms to unity.
Each entrepreneur is endowed with K0 units of capital. This endowment may be used either for
investment in the firm or for investment in a foreign capital market where it yields the riskless
exogenous interest rate r. The entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral to rule out potential
effects of risk-aversion on investment behaviour. In addition, we asssume that K0 is always large
enough to finance investment in the firm. While this assumption is not critical for our results, it
simplifies the analysis by ruling out problems arising from the potential bankruptcy of firms. 
Investment, employment and production decisions in this model are not taken simultaneously but
in a sequence of three stages. At the first stage, the firms choose the optimal level of investment.
At the time of this decision, µi is unknown. As firms are ex ante identical, all firms choose the
same capital stock, which will be denoted by (K). At the second stage, the labour market
transactions take place. At this time, µi is still unknown. The number of workers (L) and the
wage rate (w) will therefore also be the same for all firms. Note that this particular timing of
decisions, where labour market contracts are made after investment decisions have been taken,
follows the sequence in the seminal paper of Grout (1984).
At the third stage, µi is finally revealed. Given µi, each firm has to decide whether to take up
production or to close down. If the firm produces, the entrepreneur earns Y(L;K)+z µi-wL. If the
firm is closed down, the workers become unemployed and the capital goods are sold. The
liquidation of the firm yields (1+r0)K. We assume r>r0>-1, such that, while the liquidation value
of the firm is strictly positive, the return from selling the firm`s assets is less than the market rate
of interest. A firm i therefore chooses to produce if and only if
Given that firms may be liquidated, it is natural to ask whether labour contracts chosen before
the revelation of µi can be renegotiated at this final stage. To keep the analysis simple, we rule10
out this possibility here. In section 4.4., however, we will show that none of our results is
affected if renegotiation is allowed for. 
While the entrepreneurs in our economy take investment decisions and manage the firms, there
is a second group of agents, the workers. The overall number of workers is N and each worker
inelastically supplies one unit of labour such that L denotes the number of workers employed in
each firm. Workers have no initial endowment with capital. A worker of a firm which is not
liquidated earns the wage rate w while a worker who finds no job or is employed by a firm which
is closed down has an income c, which may also be interpreted as the value of leisure. The
workers are assumed to be risk neutral, i.e. they only care about their expected income.  
In the following section, we first analyse the benchmark case where no trade union exists, i.e. the
case of a competitive labour market. In section 4.3., we then assume that the workers form trade
unions, such that labour contracts are subject to bargaining between unions and firms. 
4.2. Equilibrium with Competitive Labour Markets
We determine the competitive equilibrium by solving the model recursively, beginning with the
third stage. We first note that, for given values of K, w, and L, (2) determines the critical shock
level µ
c. All firms where the productivity shock turns out to be lower than the critical level µ
c are
liquidated because the operating profits (the l.h.s. of (2)) is lower than the liquidation value (the
r.h.s. of (2)). As all firms in the economy are assumed to be distributed in the interval µ0
 [0;1],
a corner solution where no firms are liquidated with µ
c=0 may arise. Note that µ
c is also the ex
ante probability that a firm will be closed down at the third stage. Finally, as we have normalised
the overall number of firms in the economy to unity, µ
c may also be interpreted as the number of
firms which will be liquidated at stage three; hence, the number of producing firms will be 1-µ
c.
Consider now the second stage. In a competitive labour market, each firm chooses labour input
to maximize net revenue Y+zµi-wL if production is taken up. This simply yields the marginal
productivity condition YL=w. The equilibrium wage rate obviously satisfies w$c. The wage rate






analysis, it is useful to concentrate on the case of an interior solution, where the labour market
clears with L<N and w=c. The labour market equilibrium can then be described by
We finally turn to the first stage where the firms choose K. For the analysis of investment
behaviour, suppose for the sake of the argument that all firms decide to take up production, that
is  µ
c=0. We show below that this conjecture is indeed correct. Expected profits of a firm i are
thus given by
where E(µi)=1/2 is the expected value of µi. The first-order condition for K is
It remains to be shown that µ
c=0 holds in the equilibrium. To demonstrate this, one can use (3)
and (4) to write (2) as 
which implies that all firms will take up production. We thus have 
Equations (3)-(5) and the condition w=c completely describe the competitive equilbibrium, i.e.
the equilibrium values of L,K,w and the liquidation probability µ
c. The competitive equilibrium
also represents a first-best outcome in this economy and will serve as a benchmark for the
following analysis.
4.3. The Equilibrium with Union-Firm Bargaining     12
8Recall that neither the firm nor the union knows µi at this stage. This means that
differentiated wage-employment contracts are ruled out at this point in time. We shall return to












We now introduce a trade union which represents the interests of the workers. As the number of
firms is normalised to unity, we also consider one representative trade union. In line with the
assumption of risk-neutral workers, it is the objective of the union to maximize expected labour
income of workers (U) which is given by
where µ
* now denotes the probability that a firm is closed. Of course, the union essentially has
the function to raise the wage rate above the competitive wage c. 
The labour market is now characterized by union-firm bargaining, which takes place at stage two
in the sequence of decisions. As in Grout (1984), the union is assumed to know the capital stock
(K). The (representative) union and the (representative) firm bargain over wages (w) and
employment per firm (L). The outcome of this bargaining process specifies a wage-employment
contract which determines w and L.
8  
The expected profit (P) of the representative firm in stage 2, where the capital stock is given,
can be written as
The first term in (7) captures the profit of a firm which takes up production. The latter occurs
with probability (1-µ
*). The second term is the revenue from a liquidation, which occurs with
probability µ
*. 
As in much of the literature on unionised labour markets, we derive the outcome of union-firm
bargaining using the Nash-Bargaining solution (Nash, 1950). The Nash maximand is13
9Another possible approach would be to consider a dynamic framework along the lines of
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, chapter 2), where the outside option of the union is a
weighted average of unemployment benefits and wages in other firms. In the standard efficient
bargaining model, this assumption avoids the outcome that employment is as high as or even
higher than in the case of competitive labour markets. In our model, however, this is avoided by








where (0#$#1) is the relative bargaining power of the trade union. With $=1, we have the polar
case of a monopoly union; $=0 is the opposite case, where the employers hold all bargaining
power. U0 is the union`s outside option, that is the income level which would be attained if
negotiations fail, that is U0=cN.
9 Accordingly, the outside option of the firm (or, more precisely,
the entrepreneur) is simply the liquidation value: P0=(1+r 0)K.
   
As in the preceding section, the equilibrium in this economy is derived recursively. At the third
stage (where w,L and K are given), (2) allows to determine the ex ante probability µ
* that a firm
will be closed down. More formally, µ
* is given by
where (9) holds as a strict equality if µ
*>0. 
Consider now the second stage, where the bargaining between the union and the firm determines
w and L (for a given K). The bargaining parties rationally anticipate that their wage/employment
decisions will affect the liquidation probability as in equation (9). The bargaining problem is thus
to maximize (8) subject to the constraint (9):
where 8 is the multiplier for constraint (9) in the Lagrangean 7. The first-order conditions can
be written as:14
my (: $% (1&$)
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We focus on an interior solution for µ
* with µ
*>0 such that (9) is binding with 8>0 at the
optimum. Below, we will derive a sufficient condition for µ
*>0. As a first result, one can see
from (10a) and (10b) that 
The bargaining solution implies that employment in the producing firms is efficient. Using (10b),
(10c) and the (binding) constaint (9), one can now derive 
The term L(w-c) can be interpreted as the rent the union achieves in the bargaining process. This
rent simply turns out to be the fraction $/2 of the surplus generated by the most productive firm
in the economy (the term on the right-hand side of (12)). A monopoly union ($=1) would
capture half of this surplus. If the union has no bargaining power ($=0), its rent is zero.
Consequently, for a given capital stock, and if the union has some bargaining power ($>0), the
wage rate under union-firm bargaining will always exceed the wage rate in a competitive labour
market. This affects the probability of a firm to be liquidated. To see this, consider the least
productive firm in the economy, that is the firm j with µj=0. This firm will be closed if15
10This follows from the fact that Y-cL=Y-YLL>YKK and, as will be shown in the
following analysis, YK$1+r>1+r0
11Of course, this also implies that we have to assume $>0 in what follows.
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(Y(K;L)&cL&(1%r0)K) < 1 (14)
The sum of the first three terms is strictly positive.
10 If w=c, firm j will never be closed, which
confirms our result for the competitive labour market, where we have shown that µ
c
 =0. If w>c,
however, the entrepreneur may prefer to close firm j. Using (12) and making some
rearrangements shows that firm j is liquidated if and only if
We assume that (13) is satisfied, which also ensures that we have an interior solution, i.e. that
µ
*>0 holds in the equilibrium.
11 It is now also straightforward to derive the probability that a firm
will take up production (1-µ
*):
Notice that (1-µ
*) is also the number of firms which will take up production in the equilibrium
with union-firm bargaining. For a given K, it thus turns out that union-firm bargaining leads to a
decline in the number of operating firms relative to the equilibrium with a competitive labour
market. This undersupply of firms constitutes the key source of inefficiencies associated with
non-competitive labour markets in this model: a firm i will take up production if Y(K;L)+zµi -
wL-(1+r 0)K$0. From a welfare point of view, however, it is desirable to produce as long as
Y(K;L)+zµi -cL-(1+r 0)K$0. The undersupply of operating firms also induces an inefficiently low
level of employment in the economy because, for a given K, less workers are employed than
would be socially optimal. Notice also that the reason for this unemployment is the inefficiently
low number of firms while the level of employment withing each individual producing firm is
efficient since YL=c. These results can be summarised as 
Proposition 1:
If there is union-firm bargaining, and if the union has some bargaining power (0<$#1),




































2. the number of operating firms and, hence, employment for the economy as a whole is
inefficiently low.
Proof: See above.
So far, we have discussed stages two and three, where we have derived the equilibrium values of
L, w and µ
* for  a given K. For further use, we rewrite these variables as functions of K.
Straightforward comparative statics reveal:
 
and
On the basis of the results for stages two and three, we may now discuss investment behaviour
at stage one. The firm anticipates the effect of the capital stock on the bargaining outcome, i.e.
L, w and µ
*, and maximizes expected profits (I) over K:
We can now immediately state  
Proposition 2:
If there is union-firm bargaining, and if the union has some bargaining power (0<$#1) the
capital stock is inefficiently low.17
12For the second-order condition see the appendix.
13It is straightforward to show that the union`s rent, L(w-c), increases in response to
higher investment. This effect is at the heart of the analysis in Grout (1984). The effect of
unionisation on  investment is also studied in Van der Ploeg (1987), Anderson and Devereux














The first-order condition of the investor`s problem can be written as
12
which directly implies that we have 
in the equilibrium. Rewriting (19) yields 
which shows that the marginal productivity of capital now exceeds (1+r) for $>0. Relative to the
first-best, investment is thus inefficiently low. Q.E.D. 
Underinvestment occurs because the firms take into account that the benefit of an increase in the
capital stock is partly captured by the unions via the bargaining process.
13 To summarize, the
equilibrium which emerges under union-firm bargaining is thus characterised as follows. While
employment in the operating firms is efficient, there is underemployment for the economy as a
whole, because the number of operating firms is inefficiently low. There is also a suboptimal level
of investment. The magnitude of these distortions depends on the relative bargaining power of
the trade union.
4.4. An Extension: Renegotiation of Labour Contracts18
14In the terminology of agency theory, the union`s problem is a case where the firm`s iso-
profit curves in the w-L-space do not satisfy the single-crossing property, such that a pooling
equilibrium emerges.
Y(K;Lj)&wjLj>Y(K;Lk)&wkLk
So far, we have excluded that wage-employment contracts may be renegotiated at stage three.
Allowing for renegotiation would imply that wage-employment contracts are now effectively
chosen at the third stage, after the productivity shock µi
 is revealed. We assume that the
realization of  µi is private information of firms. Consider now how wage-employment contracts
are determined in this situation. To keep things simple, we focus on the case of a monopoly
union, with $=1. As before, the union seeks to maximize expected income of its members in (6).
It also has to take into account constraint (9), which may now be seen as a participation
constraint. Since the firm knows the realization of µi, it is natural to think that the union would
now use differentiated wage employment contracts inducing the firm to reveal its type. To
understand the nature of this problem, assume that the union offers two wage-employment
contracts which we denote by (wj;Lj) and (wk;Lk). As long as a firm operates, it will choose, e.g.,
contract j if 
and vice versa. This choice, however, is independent of the firm`s productivity shock µi. The firm
always chooses the contract where the cash flow term Y(K;L)-wL is highest. Note that this is a
consequence of the assumption that the productivity shock is additive. Differentiated wage-
employment contracts therefore do not allow the union to infer the firm`s true productivity. The
optimal policy of the union is thus to offer a uniform wage-employment contract, such that a
pooling equilibrium always emerges.
14 Formally, the union maximizes (6) subject to (9). Of
course, the solution to this problem is (12) with $=1. This also implies that the results derived in
section 4.3. do not change if we allow for renegotiation. In what follows, we therefore return to
the original model.   
5. Employment versus Investment Subsidies
 
The preceding analysis has shown that trade union power gives rise to employment and













(tK%JwL)dmy ’ 0 (22)
government interventions. Since all agents are risk-neutral, we use aggregate surplus as a welfare
criterion. This surplus (R) can be written as
In the present section, we introduce two policy instruments. A capital tax (or, if negative, a
subsidy) denoted by t and a payroll tax (or subsidy) which we denote by J. In the appendix, we
integrate these two taxes/subsidies into our model and again derive the equilibrium under
union/firm bargaining, as in section 4.3. 
It is straightforward to show that, considered separately, and assuming lump sum financing, the
introduction of both subsidy types would raise welfare. This is not particularly surprising. It is
the purpose of this paper, however, to compare the efficiency of employmnent and investment
subsidies. In order to make this comparison, we therefore assume that, if an investment subsidy
is to be paid, it has to be financed by a tax on labour, and vice versa. The government budget
constraint is thus
Analysing the effect of the two subsidies/taxes on investment, employment, the number of firms
and welfare leads to the following results:
Proposition 3:      
If there is union-firm bargaining, and if the union has some bargaining power (0<$#1),
introducing an investment subsidy financed by a labour tax
1. raises the capital stock in the operating firms,
2. has an ambiguous effect on overall employment
3. raises the number of operating firms and
4. raises welfare.  20
Proof: See the appendix.
Intuitively, these results may be explained as follows. First of all, it is surprising that there is no
unambiguous decline in employment per firm (and overall employment). The reason is that the
higher capital stock c.p. raises employment and thus counteracts the negative effect of the higher
labour tax. It is theoretically possible that employment in the existing firms increases, in spite of
the higher labour tax. This occurs if c approaches zero (see equation (A.15) in the appendix).
The reason is that the labour tax is partly a tax on the worker`s rents, which are a consequence
of union power.
The reason why welfare increases is best understood by considering the combined effect of the
investment subsidy and the labour tax on the number of operating firms. Ceteris paribus, an
increase in the labour tax would reduce the number of firms while the capital subsidy has the
opposite effect. The key point is now that, on balance, the number of firms increases. This also
raises investment and ensures in this model that the overall welfare effect of the labour tax
financed capital subsidy is positive.
6. Conclusions
It is the purpose of this paper to find an explanation for the empirical observation that
governments prefer investment to employment subsidies in policies aiming at the support of
regions or sectors with high rates of unemployment. We have compared investment and
employment subsidies in a model where union-firm bargaining gives rise to unemployment by
reducing the number of active firms in the economy.  It turns out that, while no unambiguous
conclusions can be drawn for the relative effectiveness of the two subsidies in promoting
employment, investment subsidies dominate employment subsidies in terms of welfare. It may





































In this appendix, we derive the equilibrium under union-firm bargaining with the subsidies/taxes
t and J. For µ
*>0, the marginal firm is now characterized by the condition:
Expected profits of the representative firm (P) are now 
The objective function of the union does not change. The bargaining solution now yields the
following equations:
and 
The investor`s objective function is
The first-order condition of the investor`s problem becomes 





























































For later use, we note that the second-order condition requires
which we assume to hold. The equilibrium is thus characterized by equations (A.1), (A.3), (A.4)
and (A.6). We now derive the effect of a simultaneous change in t and J, departing from an
equilibrium with t = J=0. A change in t and J which keeps the budget balanced implies
Totally differentiating equations (A.3), (A.4), (A.6), and using the total differential of (A.1) and
dJ=-dtK/wL yields   
and
Equations (A.11)-(A.13) determine dL, dK and dµ



















































to hold. For this condition to be satisfied it is sufficient to assume a homogenous production
function with decreasing returns to scale. For the effect on employment per firm, we get
which is ambiguous but becomes positive if c is small. For µ
* (remember that the number of
operating firms is (1-µ
*), we have
Equations (A.14)-(A.16) prove parts 1-3 of proposition 3. The welfare effect is derived by
differentiating equation (21). It is easy to check that, in the equilibrium, we have 
This implies
which completes the proof of proposition 3.4.Q.E.D.
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